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 A university department has invited a controversial academic speaker to deliver a series 
of three lectures.  A group of left-wing students considers some of the speaker’s writings, 
especially his analysis of the causes of Black urban poverty, to be racist.  At the first event the 
speaker is harassed by a few members of the audience but is able to deliver his lecture.  At the 
second, some students take over the platform in order to prevent the lecture from proceeding.  As 
a result, the second and third lectures are cancelled.
 Sound familiar?  Instances of disruption, disinvitation, or ‘no-platforming’ of invited 
speakers have recently become commonplace on university campuses, especially in the United 
States.1  But the foregoing event was not recent, and it occurred in Canada.  The speaker in 
question was the well-known conservative sociologist Edward Banfield, the host of the planned 
lecture series was the Department of Political Economy at the University of Toronto, and the date 
was March 1974.2  At the time the university was heavily criticized for its handling of the affair, 
especially for its failure to ensure that the remaining lectures could go forward without 
disruption.  University administrators continue to face criticism for the ways in which they 
choose to intervene, or not to intervene, in speaking events held on their campuses.  Clearly the 
fact that these problems are not new has not made them any easier to solve. 
 In its broadest form, the question we have before us is this: When university 
administrators learn of a planned speaking event on campus that looks likely to be contentious or 
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circumstances?  In this form, however, the question is too broad.  As one way of narrowing it, I 
will specify that ‘university administrators’ are here to be understood as those with the ultimate 
responsibility for overseeing such events (usually the academic vice-president).  Similar 
questions may apply to more junior levels of administration (deans, directors, department chairs, 
etc.), but I will confine my attention to the desk where the buck stops.
 We also need a more focussed understanding of the ways in which campus speech might 
be ‘contentious or problematic’.  At one time obscenity might have been an issue (imagine that 
the campus film society announces a screening of Deep Throat), but those issues have latterly 
rather receded from view.  The dominating concern of today is hate speech, understood broadly 
as any form of expression that is intended to arouse hatred or contempt toward members of a 
particular social group.  I will follow that trend, so that our question now becomes: When top 
university administrators have reason to believe that a planned speaking event on campus may 
feature hate speech (at least in the eyes of some), how should they respond? 
 In what follows I will address that question (or at least some aspects of it) as it arises for 
Canadian universities.  With that setting in mind, some legal context is important.  In Canada, 
unlike the United States, hate speech is regulated by criminal law.  Section 319(2) of the 
Criminal Code prohibits ‘communicating statements, other than in private conversation’ that 
‘wilfully promote hatred against any identifiable group’.3  For the purpose of this section, an 
‘identifiable group’ is defined as ‘any section of the public distinguished by colour, race, 
religion, national or ethnic origin, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or 
mental or physical disability’.4  It is worth noting that in order to secure a conviction for 
promoting hatred it is both necessary and sufficient to establish that the speaker intended that 
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 The law of the land applies everywhere, including on university campuses.  So if a 
campus speaker is unwise enough to engage in hate speech, within the meaning of the statute, 
then they expose themselves to the possibility of a charge and of prosecution.  In this event, there 
is no role for university administrators; enforcement of the criminal law is a police matter.  
(Actually, there may be a role for administrators, but I will return to that later.)  
 Furthermore, administrators would be unwise to take pre-emptive action—even action 
that falls short of cancelling the event—in anticipation that an invited speaker might cross the 
line.  In March 2010 the American right-wing commentator Ann Coulter was scheduled to give a 
talk at the University of Ottawa.  Prior to the event the university’s academic vice-president sent 
Coulter a warning, cautioning her to watch her words lest she face criminal charges for 
promoting hatred.  Coulter subsequently cancelled the event, not strictly because of the warning, 
but because sponsors feared that demonstrations outside the venue might turn violent.  In a 
subsequent interview, Coulter did not neglect the opportunity to mock the university: ‘It's at the 
absolute bush league, bottom of the barrel schools that you get the worst treatment and still I've 
never seen this before.  I'm guessing the scores to get into the University of Ottawa are not very 
challenging.’5
 The legal restrictions of hate speech are, however, only part of the story, and ultimately 
not a very important part.  As I have said, when those restrictions are transgressed in campus 
speech, university administrators have little to do except let the law take its course.  The more 
serious and difficult question concerns campus speech that is hateful without rising to the level of 
a criminal offence.  Freedom of expression enjoys constitutional protection under section 2(b) of 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  In order not to offend the Charter, the bar for a successful 
prosecution for hate promotion has been set very high, by providing speakers with a formidable 
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immunized against prosecution if they ‘were relevant to any subject of public interest, the 
discussion of which was for the public benefit, and if on reasonable grounds he believed them to 
be true’.6  That’s a loophole that only the most extreme, or obtuse, speaker could fail to take 
advantage of.  (Perhaps the University of Ottawa administration should also have informed 
Coulter of that fact.)
 The implication of all this for university administrators is that campus speech may be 
hateful without being unlawful.  The waters are further muddied by the fact that the key 
components of the hate speech law are themselves vague and contentious; what may appear to 
some as an attempt to arouse hatred will look to others as honest and tough-minded political 
commentary.  As an example, let’s use Israeli Apartheid Week (IAW), a series of lectures and 
rallies that is held annually on some Canadian campuses.  The avowed aim of its organizers is to 
‘educate people about the nature of Israel as an apartheid system’ and to build support for a 
global Boycott, Divestment, and Sanction campaign against Israel.7  So far, it seems to fit 
comfortably within the bounds of political speech critical of Israel, and neither the organizers nor 
the speakers have ever been charged with promoting hatred.  However, many of these events 
have been accused by observers, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, of being anti-Semitic.8   Since the 
law of the land is not in play here, the burden of deciding whether to respond to Israeli Apartheid 
Week, and if so in what way, falls squarely on the shoulders of university administrators.  
 Campus events featuring right-wing provocateurs like Ann Coulter are likely to fall in the 
same grey area.  Coulter, who has argued that American immigration policies amount to the 
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or religious or ethnic constituency on campus.  But what she has to say is also unlikely to rise to 
the level of a criminal offence, even if she is not tutored on Canadian law in advance of her 
appearance.  
 What is the appropriate response by the university administration in advance of these 
sorts of events?  Would there ever be grounds for intervening to cancel any of them?  I want to 
think about this question in the following way.10  The jurisdiction of university administrators 
over speaking events ends at the boundaries of their campus.  It would be equally open to some 
off-campus group to stage Israeli Apartheid Week, or to invite Coulter to speak, at a venue 
elsewhere in the community.  In that case, municipal officials would face the same decision 
whether to allow the event to proceed.  We can then ask whether the factors to be taken into 
account in making this decision are the same on- and off-campus.  Do university administrators 
have more reason to intervene in a situation like this, or less?  Should the bounds of free speech 
be narrower on campus, or broader?  (Or, perhaps, just the same.)
 There are arguments to be made for each option, arguments that speak to the special 
nature and mission of the university.  The strongest case in favour of a very broad free speech 
zone on campus invokes the traditional idea of the university as a domain with a distinctive 
commitment to open and free inquiry.  The University of Toronto puts this point in the following 
way:
...the essential purpose of the University is to engage in the pursuit of truth, the 
advancement of learning and the dissemination of knowledge.  To achieve this purpose, 
all members of the University must have as a prerequisite freedom of speech and 
expression, which means the right to examine, question, investigate, speculate, and 
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It seems to follow from this conception of the university’s mission that speakers should be free to 
express, and audiences should be free to hear, all opinions on matters of public interest, however 
odious or offensive to some those opinions might be.  The University of Toronto draws this very 
conclusion: 
The University must allow the fullest range of debate.  It should not limit that debate by 
preordaining conclusions, or punishing or inhibiting the reasonable exercise of free 
speech.12  
The University of Chicago has taken a very similar position in a widely influential statement of 
principle:
Because the University is committed to free and open inquiry in all matters, it guarantees 
all members of the University community the broadest possible latitude to speak, write, 
listen, challenge, and learn.... [I]t is not the proper role of the University to attempt to 
shield individuals from ideas and opinions they find unwelcome, disagreeable, or even 
deeply offensive....  [T]he University’s fundamental commitment is to the principle that 
debate or deliberation may not be suppressed because the ideas put forth are thought by 
some or even by most members of the University community to be offensive, unwise, 
immoral, or wrong-headed.  It is for the individual members of the University 
community, not for the University as an institution, to make those judgments for 
themselves, and to act on those judgments not by seeking to suppress speech, but by 
openly and vigorously contesting the ideas that they oppose.13 
These ‘Chicago Principles’ have subsequently been adopted or endorsed at more than seventy 
post-secondary institutions across the United States.
 On this view of the university’s purpose, its administrators should be particularly 
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authorities, who lack the same sense of mission.  In that case, the bounds of free expression must 
not be narrower on campus than they are in the nonacademic world, and arguably should be 
wider.
 Arguments for the contrary view, however, are also rooted in a conception of the peculiar 
nature of the university.  I will consider four of them.
1.  The argument from academic freedom.  One version of this argument has been articulated and 
defended in a recent article by Robert Mark Simpson.14  As Simpson conceives of it, academic 
freedom resembles free speech in guaranteeing a wide-ranging liberty of expression and inquiry, 
but differs from it by applying strictly within the special scholarly domains of teaching and 
research.15  Within these domains, Simpson argues, it is accompanied by the expectation that 
scholarly work is properly ‘subject to quality controls on the basis of general professional 
standards of accuracy and coherence’,16 controls for which, he suggests, there is no real analogue 
in the case of non-scholarly on-campus speaking activities.  Simpson’s argumentative target is 
this misalignment between academic freedom and campus speech; the standards of the former, he 
argues, should be applied to the latter:
...[S]peech expressing ill-informed or badly reasoned ideas need not receive any special 
protection in universities, except if it falls under the protection of academic freedom, for 
example, if it occurs as part of the university’s formal teaching and research activities.  
Free speech is a fundamental liberty in social intercourse per se, but it is not a mandatory 
commitment for the university.  Thus, we can at least sometimes exclude or marginalize 
speakers and ideas that fall short of the intellectual standards which define academia and 
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It follows from Simpson’s analysis that speech that might be properly allowed in the wider 
community may properly be disallowed on campus.  Simpson proposes that speaking invitations 
by campus groups be vetted, not by university administrators, but by faculty experts in the 
appropriate field.  (This vetting would apply to all campus speakers, not just those thought likely 
to promote hatred.)  ‘And where the considered judgment of the institution’s academic experts is 
that an invited speaker’s work manifestly fails to attain to the kind of intellectual standards that 
further its epistemic mission, then, other things being equal, that institution should refrain from 
offering a platform to that speaker.’18 
 I leave to others to imagine how well a system requiring speaker invitations by student 
groups to be approved by faculty experts might work out in practice.  There is, it seems to me, a 
much deeper problem with Simpson’s analysis and proposal.  Let’s return to his starting point, 
the topic of academic freedom.  According to the Canadian Association of University Teachers:
Academic freedom includes the right, without restriction by prescribed doctrine, to 
freedom to teach and discuss; freedom to carry out research and disseminate and publish 
the results thereof; freedom to produce and perform creative works; freedom to engage in 
service; freedom to express one’s opinion about the institution, its administration, and the 
system in which one works; freedom to acquire, preserve, and provide access to 
documentary material in all formats; and freedom to participate in professional and 
representative academic bodies. Academic freedom always entails freedom from 
institutional censorship.19
Notable by its absence from this statement is any reference to the quality of the work that 
academics are to be free to engage in; they are equally free to carry out their teaching and 
research, without institutional interference, whether they do it well or badly.  Of course, they are 
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assessed for purposes such as tenure, promotion, and remuneration.  But these assessments are a 
matter not of academic freedom but of academic or professional standards.  If a faculty member 
is denied tenure or promotion on the basis of negative assessments of the quality of their teaching 
or research, this outcome is not a restriction of their academic freedom but a judgement of their 
failure to live up to professional expectations.20     
 Simpson constantly conflates the two, to the detriment of his argument.  That argument 
actually has little to do with academic freedom and rests instead on the premise that the standards 
that are appropriate in classroom teaching, in research seminars, in professional conferences and 
workshops, and in the preparation of scholarly work for publication should also be applied 
outside these contexts to all other activities on campus.21  Any invited speaker whose credentials 
fail to meet these standards may properly be denied a campus platform.  That high bar will 
suffice to exclude Ann Coulter, and possibly also some of the presenters at Israeli Apartheid 
Week, as well as a host of other nonacademic speakers who may not hold advanced degrees or 
qualify as experts in their field.  However, these invited speakers are not engaged in any of the 
aforementioned scholarly activities, nor are they contending for tenure, promotion, or a salary 
increase; instead, they have been solicited because they have been deemed to have something 
worthwhile to say on some matter of public interest.  Despite their lack of academic credentials, 
there may still be much to learn from them.
2.  The argument from civility.  Simpson also makes the related point that discourse in scholarly 
settings—in classrooms, research seminars, etc.—is expected to be civil.  (Anyone who has 
attended many academic presentations knows that they are not always civil.)  Uncivil discourse 
can lead to distress on the part of targeted audience members, which Simpson suggests ‘is out of 
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room itself.  It is a kind of distress which is not integral to the targeted individual’s learning 
experience, and which can greatly detract from it.’22  This is now a rather different ground for 
regulating campus speech.  Speakers need not be experts, and need not measure up to lofty 
academic standards, and may in principle espouse any opinions they like, as long as they do so in 
a civil manner.  Ann Coulter and Israeli Apartheid Week will still not make the cut, but now for a 
different reason.  
 Since we all think civility a good thing, this is an appealing idea.  However, those who 
contend that the university may rightly suppress uncivil speech must face the question how this 
might be accomplished.  Incivility admits of many gradations, from the merely ill-mannered to 
the scurrilous and abusive.  Where is the line to be drawn at what is acceptable on campus, and 
who is to draw it?  Most university administrators seem to show little relish for serving as the 
arbiters of civility.  The University of Toronto states that  ‘...although no member of the 
University should use language or indulge in behaviour intended to demean others..., the values 
of mutual respect and civility may, on occasion, be superseded by the need to protect lawful 
freedom of speech.’23  The University of Chicago takes an even stronger stand: ‘Although the 
University greatly values civility, and although all members of the University community share 
in the responsibility for maintaining a climate of mutual respect, concerns about civility and 
mutual respect can never be used as a justification for closing off discussion of ideas, however 
offensive or disagreeable those ideas may be to some members of our community.’24 
  Simpson’s appeal to civility serves to remind us that we need to distinguish two different 
kinds of restraint on speech.  Content restrictions stipulate certain ideas or opinions that may not 
be expressed by any speaker on any occasion.25  Holocaust denial might serve as a case in point.  
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the wrong time, or in the wrong place, or in the wrong manner.  John Stuart Mill, who rejected 
content restrictions on speech, was alive to this distinction.  The opinion that corn dealers are 
starvers of the poor, he says, may be freely circulated through the press but may not be delivered 
to an angry mob assembled in front of the corn dealer’s house.26  Civility constraints are context 
restrictions on campus speech: you may express hateful views, but only in language that is subtle 
and coded, rather than forceful and blunt.  For the most part, the hate promotion section of the 
Criminal Code imposes a content restriction: you may not use language that wilfully promotes 
hatred against an identifiable group (unless you are saved by one of the available defences).  
However, it also contains a context restriction: you are not liable if you use that language ‘in 
private conversation’. There is a strong case to be made that university administrators should not 
be in the business of imposing content restrictions on campus speech.  Time, place, and manner 
restrictions, however, may be another matter. 
 The ‘Chicago Principles’ stipulate that ‘the University may reasonably regulate the time, 
place, and manner of expression to ensure that it does not disrupt the ordinary activities of the 
University’.  The University of Toronto Statement on Freedom of Speech is more specific: ‘Of 
necessity, there are limits to the right of free speech, for example, when members of the 
University use speech as a direct attack that has the effect of preventing the lawful exercise of 
speech by members or invited guests, or interfering with the exercise of authorized University 
business, the University may intervene.’  
 It follows from this statement that in the Banfield affair the university would have been 
justified in suppressing the speech (and conduct) of the protesting students in order to permit 
Banfield’s lectures to proceed.  In fact, we can say something stronger: acting in this way would 
have been not merely permissible, but obligatory. To this point we have been tacitly assuming 
that the duties of university administrators vis-à-vis campus speech are entirely negative: duties 
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more germane are positive duties to facilitate or enable speech events, by not permitting others to 
shut them down.  This was the signal failing of the University of Toronto administration in 1974: 
it should have taken steps to ensure that Banfield’s two remaining lectures could be delivered at a 
time and in a place where they could be protected from intervention by protestors, if necessary by 
the use of campus, or even municipal, police.  The protesting students were entitled to advocate 
their point of view, but not in such a way as to suppress Banfield’s speech.       
 The university may therefore be permitted, or even required, to intervene when campus 
speech becomes sufficiently unruly or disruptive.  But this does not give it a licence to screen all 
speaking events for possible incivility.  It is not Israeli Apartheid Week or a talk by Ann Coulter 
that is likely to have the effect of ‘preventing the lawful exercise of speech’, but rather the 
reactions of their opponents.  
3.  The argument from student protection.  Simpson’s appeal to civility noted the distress that 
uncivil speech can cause to ‘targeted audience members’.  However, this point could be 
broadened to apply to hate speech in general.  There is no reasonable doubt that racist, sexist, or 
homophobic discourse can hurt its intended targets.  The university already has the responsibility 
to protect vulnerable students, as much as it can, against such threats as racist bullying and sexual 
harassment.  It would therefore be but a short step to argue that it should also take steps to protect 
them from the hurt that can be inflicted by insults or abuse.  
 However, I am skeptical that universities have this in loco parentis function of sheltering 
their students against the pernicious effects of hate.  For one thing, the very idea of making the 
campus a ‘safe space’ in this respect seems quixotic.  In the age of social media, hate speech is 
pervasive; it does not respect campus boundaries and students cannot be insulated against it.  
Unlike other vectors on which hatred can spread unchecked, scheduled on-campus speaking 
events have the great advantage of being optional and easily avoided; if you don’t want to listen 
to Ann Coulter fulminate about Mexicans or Muslims, then you need only give her talk a miss.  
In any case, if the university does indeed have this protective responsibility toward its students, 
then there is a more constructive way for it to fulfil it than by preventing them from hearing 
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controversial speakers.  One function the university clearly does have is to teach students to think 
critically, to demand evidence for opinions, to challenge outlandish assertions, and to see through 
lies, distortions, and misrepresentations.  If it has done its job, then it will have equipped them to 
fight back against hateful speech with the weapons of facts and logic.  University administrators 
who consider no-platforming speakers show no confidence in the ability of their students to call 
out hateful rhetoric for what it is.  If anything, students should be less in need of protection 
against the hurtful effects of extreme speech than members of the broader community who have 
not had the same educational advantages.     
4.  The argument from legitimization. This argument is often put in the following form: when a 
university hosts an event like Israeli Apartheid Week, or a speaker like Coulter, it implicitly 
legitimizes the opinions that will thereby be espoused.  Universities, it will be said, are 
prestigious institutions, and so their prestige will rub off on their invited speakers.  Neil Levy 
puts this point nicely, in a slightly more technical way.  Levy distinguishes between two kinds of 
evidence for a speaker’s opinions: first-order evidence, which consists in the arguments for and 
against those opinions, and higher-order evidence, which bears on determining whether the 
speaker’s opinions deserve to be taken seriously.  
An invitation to speak at a university campus, a prestigious event or to write an opinion 
piece for a newspaper provides (prima facie) higher-order evidence.  It is evidence that 
the speaker is credible; that she has an opinion deserving a respectful hearing.  It typically 
certifies expertise, and expertise is higher-order evidence that the person’s opinion should 
be given particular weight....27
 There is clearly something to this argument.  When an academic unit in a university (a 
faculty, department, centre, etc.), or a group of faculty members in such a unit, issues an 
invitation to a visiting speaker, they are indeed implying that this person has the appropriate 
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of the unit in question have the expertise to determine who is, and who is not, worth listening to, 
and they have no interest in wasting their time, and their colleagues’ time, on second-raters or 
charlatans.  So such an invitation does constitute higher-order evidence of credibility.  Having 
been an invited speaker at the highly rated Department of X at the internationally renowned 
University of Y can add luster to any curriculum vitae.  In the case of these invitations, however, 
it is hard to imagine university administrators having grounds to overrule the academic 
judgements of their colleagues.
 The point, however, does not generalize to other campus speaking events, especially 
invitations by student groups.  They may well lack the expertise to distinguish wheat from chaff, 
or may decide to invite someone, like Coulter, just because they are provocative, or have 
celebrity status, or are likely to fill the hall.  A speaking invitation from a student group will 
often not constitute higher-order evidence of expertise or credibility, in which case university 
administrators have no more reason to no-platform a campus speaker than do their municipal 
counterparts.  We are reminded here again of Simpson’s distinction between the more scholarly 
domains of the university and the rest of the campus: the conventions and assumptions that apply 
to the former may have no purchase in the latter.28
 Levy’s point, however, does apply particularly forcefully to one category of speaker 
invitations: those issued by the university itself.  In inviting someone to address commencement, 
for instance, the university administration is clearly certifying this person as having the requisite 
knowledge or experience to deliver a message it would benefit the graduating students to hear.  It 
is therefore very important for university administrators to vet proposed commencement speakers 
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unscientific.  As some universities have discovered to their regret, the cost of not doing their 
homework can be high.29
 To recapitulate, the question I have been addressing is whether the bounds of free speech 
should be broader or narrower on campus than in the outside world.  Broader limits are supported 
by the mission of the university to promote and protect free inquiry.  Four arguments were then 
canvassed on the other side of the question: that campus speech should be held to the high 
standards of scholarly discourse, that uncivil speech should be discouraged or suppressed, that 
students deserve special protection from hate, and that university platforms can confer legitimacy 
on speakers with hateful or otherwise objectionable messages.  My conclusion is that none of 
these latter arguments succeed, thus that the bounds of free speech should be at least as broad—
and arguably should be broader—on the university campus as they are elsewhere in the 
community.  
 This result is good news for university administrators.  As far as the regulation of campus 
speech is concerned, what ethical governance will demand of them will nearly always be: 
absolutely nothing.  They will have reason to become actively involved only in order to ensure 
that a speaking event proceeds safely, or when it threatens to disrupt the functioning of the 
university, or when it is itself threatened with disruption by protesting groups.  In those instances 
the justification for intervention will be to protect and facilitate speech, not to shut it down.  
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